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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
vs.
ROGER EUGENE PENMAN,

])

Case No. 960639-CA

]
•
]

Priority No. 3

Defendant/Appellant. !

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from convictions for manslaughter, a
second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-205
(1995), and robbery, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah
Code Ann. § 76-6-301 (1995) .

This Court has jurisdiction over

the appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (e) (1996).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL AND
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
1.

Did the trial court correctly deny defendant's motion

to withdraw his pleas because defendant understood the nature and
elements of the offenses to which he pleaded?
This Court "review[s] a trial court's denial of a motion to
withdraw a guilty plea under an abuse-of-discretion standard.
The trial court's findings of fact made in conjunction with its

decision will not be set aside unless they are clearly
erroneous."

State v. Blair, 868 P.2d 802, 805 (Utah 1993)

(citations omitted).

State v. Lopez. 873 P.2d 1127, 1130 (Utah

1994)("[W]hen a trial court has failed to make findings of fact
on the record, [the reviewing court] will 'assume that the [trial
court found facts] in accord with its decision7 whenever it would
be 'reasonable to assume that the court actually made such
findings.'")(quoting State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 787-88 & n.6
(Utah 1991)) .
2.

Was defendant afforded effective assistance of counsel

such that his pleas were knowingly and voluntarily entered?
Ineffective assistance of counsel claims present a mixed
question of law and fact.

Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 521,

525 (Utah 1994) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,
698 (1984) and Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985)); accord
State v. Perry, 899 P.2d 1232, 1238 (Utah App. 1995).

A

reviewing court will defer to the trial court's factual findings
and will review the trial court's application of the law to the
findings for correctness.

Id. (citing State v. Hay, 859 P.2d 1,

4-5 (Utah 1993)) .
3.

Did the defendant waive his rights to a speedy

disposition of the charges under the Interstate Agreement on
2

Detainers Act?
u

[W]ithdrawal of a guilty plea is a privilege, not a right,

that is left to the trial court's sound discretion."

State v.

Brocksmith, 888 P.2d 703, 704 (Utah App. 1994) (citations
omitted).

Therefore, an appellate court "will not disturb a

trial court's determination that the defendant has failed to show
good cause or its ultimate denial of the motion to withdraw the
guilty plea 'unless it clearly appears that the trial court
abused its discretion.'" Id. (quoting State v. Trujillo-Martinez,
814 P.2d 596, 599 (Utah App. 1991)).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
The following provisions are relevant to the issues in this
case and are set out in Addendum A:
Rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure;
Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6 (1995);
Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-5 (1995) .
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged with murder in the second degree,
aggravated robbery, and aggravated burglary, all first degree
felonies, and two counts of theft, both second degree felonies
(Criminal Trial, Dist. Ct. No. Cr-88-1015, "Crim. Tr." at 8-9).
He subsequently pleaded no contest to manslaughter an: guilty to
robbery (Crim. Tr. 265-74), and was sentenced to serve two one3

to-fifteen year terms, to run concurrently, at the Utah State
Prison (Crim. Tr. 93-94).

Defendant later moved to withdraw his

pleas (Crim. Tr. at 149-210).

This is a direct appeal from the

trial court's denial of defendant's motion.1
STATEMENT QF THE FACTS
On or about November 1, 1987 at his home in Midvale, Utah,
Spencer Nielson was robbed and then shot and killed (Crim. Tr. 910, 200). Shortly thereafter, defendant and Monte "Bo" Johnston
were arrested following a high-speed chase with authorities in
Wyoming (Crim. Tr. 201). Oriental artifacts, identical to those
taken from Nielson's home, were discovered in defendant's vehicle
(Crim. Tr. 201). Several 20-gauge shotgun shells were also
recovered from defendant's pockets (Crim. Tr. 201). These shells
were subsequently sent to the FBI Laboratory for analysis (Habeas
Corpus Proceedings, Dist. Ct. No. 9409033286, R. 240-41).
Pursuant to an immunity agreement, Johnston agreed to speak
to officers from the Salt Lake Sheriff's Office (Crim. Tr. 201).
Johnston explained that he had accompanied defendant, Wendall

1

Although defendant has captioned this case as an appeal
from both a direct appeal and an appeal from the denial of a
petition for writ of habeus corpus, as the facts set forth below
and the discussion immediately following show, it is properly
only a direct appeal from Judge Rokich's order denying
defendant's motion to withdraw his pleas, dated August 14, 1992.
4

Devon Baer, and Rick Lewis a.k.a. Kevin Baer to the Nielson
residence on Halloween night (Crim. Tr. 202-03).

That night,

defendant was armed with a 20-gauge sawed-off shotgun (Crim. Tr.
202).

After stealing numerous oriental artifacts and other

property, Johnston and defendant re-entered the residence and
defendant shot Nielson with the 20-gauge shotgun (Crim. Tr. 202).
A later polygraph revealed truthfulness on Johnston's part (Crim.
Tr. 202).
Defendant and Rick Lewis were subsequently arrested, and
Lewis agreed to cooperate in exchange for a reduction in charges
(Crim. Tr. 2 03).

In a sworn statement, Lewis corroborated the

details given by Johnston but could not state with certainty who
shot the victim (Crim Tr. 203). A polygraph also revealed
truthfulness on Lewis's part (Crim. Tr. 203).
In January 1988, defendant was charged with murder in the
second degree, aggravated robbery, and aggravated burglary, all
first degree felonies, and two counts of theft, both second
degree felonies (Crim. Tr. at 8-9). Defendant was incarcerated
in Nevada at the time charges were filed and he apparently filed
for a 180-day disposition under the Interstate Agreement on
Detainers Act ("IAD"), Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-5 (1995) (Crim. Tr.
4; R. 7 ) . Defendant later waived his rights under the IAD, on
5

the advice of counsel, in order to prepare his defense and
conduct further investigations (Crim. Tr. 3-4; R. 14-15).
Shortly before defendant's preliminary hearing and after
being served with a subpoena, Johnston absconded (Crim. Tr. 2 03).
During the preliminary hearing, defendant's counsel stipulated
that Johnston had been subpoenaed (Crim. Tr. at 4 ) .
On October 28, 1988, defendant knowingly and voluntarily
entered a no contest plea to manslaughter and a guilty plea to
robbery (Crim. Tr. 265-74).

He was sentenced to serve two one-

to-fifteen year terms, to run concurrently, at the Utah State
Prison (Crim. Tr. 93-94) .
After a series of delays in having new counsel appointed,
defendant filed a motion to withdraw his pleas in March 1992 on
the ground that his pleas were unknowing and involuntary, in part
due to his former counsel's ineffective assistance (Crim. Tr. at
149-210).

On August 14, 1992 the trial court denied defendant's

motion (Crim. Tr. at 242-43).

Instead of appealing the court's

denial of his motion, nineteen months later, in March 1994,
defendant filed a petition for a writ of habeus corpus, claiming
again that his pleas were unknowing and involuntary, and, for the
first time, that his rights to a preliminary hearing and to a
timely trial under the IAD had been violated.
6

Defendant also

augmented his challenge to his pleas, claiming for the first time
that his trial counsel had failed to obtain exculpatory results
of FBI ballistics tests (R. 2-110).

In response, the State filed

a motion for summary judgment, arguing that defendant was
procedurally barred from raising claims in a post-conviction
proceeding that he could have raised on direct appeal (R. 160215).

Following argument, Judge Bohling granted the State's

motion on the ground that defendant's claims were procedurally
barred and because he was unpersuaded that defendant did not
knowingly and voluntarily enter his pleas (R. 264; 280-85).
Defendant then filed a notice of appeal from the dismissal
of his petition (R. 287). The Utah Court of Appeals reversed
Judge Bohling's summary judgment dismissal of defendant's
petition for a writ of habeus corpus without addressing the
ruling that the pleas were given knowingly and voluntarily,
stating,
nx

[o]nee a trial court on habeas review determines that
a defendant has been denied the constitutional right to
appeal, a direct appeal should be provided immediately,

without adjudication
ineffective assistance

of any other claims,
of
counsel.'"

such as

(R. 338-39)(quoting State v. Gordon, 913 P.2d 350, 357 (Utah App.
1996))(emphasis in original)(quoting State v. Hallett. 856 P.2d
1060, 1062 (Utah 1993)).

Therefore, this Court remanded the case
7

for reentry of the order denying defendant's motion to withdraw
his pleas in order to allow defendant to have a first appeal of
right from that order (R. 338-39).

In accordance with this

Court's order, Judge Bohling reentered the trial court's order of
August 14, 1992 tunc pro nunc (Crim Tr. 258; R. 341).

Defendant

then filed a notice of appeal in September 1996, making this his
first appeal of right (R. 348) .2
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

POINT I
Defendant's pleas to manslaughter and robbery were knowingly
and voluntarily entered.

Defendant executed affidavits clearly

2

Notwithstanding the express directive of this Court
limiting defendant to an appeal of the trial court's denial of
his motion to withdraw his no contest and guilty pleas, defendant
filed a notice of appeal not only challenging the trial court's
denial of his motion to withdraw his pleas (Case No. CR-88-1051),
but also challenging Judge Bohling's dismissal of his habeas
petition (Case No. 940903286HC), thereby unilaterally providing
himself with a second attack at the substantive rulings in the
dismissal of his petition (R. 358). If defendant was
dissatisfied with the limitations of this Court's decision, he
should have petitioned this Court for rehearing or petitioned the
Utah Supreme Court for writ of certiorari. Alteratively,
defendant should have moved in the trial court, on the basis of
additional grounds, for reconsideration of its denial of his
motion. In declining these appropriate alternative routes,
defendant has improperly attempted to supplement his original
motion to withdraw his guilty pleas with claims newly raised in
his habeas petition, an outcome plainly beyond this Court's
contemplation in limiting his appeal to the denial of his
original motion.

8

and unambiguously setting out the elements of the offenses and
the facts of the crimes in terms of those elements . At the plea
hearing the trial court discussed with defendant his affidavit,
restated the facts of the offense as they applied to the elements
of the offenses, and elicited from defendant his understanding of
the affidavit and that he was surrendering constitutional rights
by pleading.
POINT II
Defendant's claims are waived by virtue of his voluntarily
entering pleas.

Even upon consideration, defendant's claims,

that his counsel and the prosecutor

withheld from him

"exculpatory" information concerning witnesses and tests
conducted on physical evidence are based primarily on conjecture,
are without evidentiary support, and do not justify a belief that
defendant would otherwise have withdrawn his pleas.
POINT III
Defendant's claim challenging the trial court's
jurisdiction, based on the Interstate Agreement on Detainers and
an alleged defect in his preliminary hearing, is not properly
before the Court because it was not embraced by the trial court's
denial of his motion to withdraw his pleas, the only basis for
this appeal.

Additionally, defendant waived the claim when he
9

voluntarily entered his pleas.

In any case, defendant

voluntarily waived the period in which he was required to be
brought to trial, and any impropriety in the prosecutor's failing
to clarify the nature of a witness's possible immunity agreement
was not prejudicial considering the evidence in support of
defendant's bindover.
ARGUMENT
PQINT I
DEFENDANT'S PLEAS TO MANSLAUGHTER AND ROBBERY WERE
KNOWINGLY AND VOLUNTARILY ENTERED.
Defendant argues that his guilty plea and his no contest
plea did not strictly comply with the requirements of rule 11(e),
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, and State v. Gibbons, 74 0 P.2d
1309 (Utah 1987), because he did not understand the nature and
elements of the offenses to which he pleaded.
16.

Appellant's Br. at

However, the record indicates defendant had a clear

understanding of the nature and elements of both manslaughter and
robbery.
A.

Defendant's Pleas were made in Strict Compliance with
Rule 11(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure.

Rule 11(e) (4) provides: "The court may refuse to accept a
plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and mentally ill, and may
not accept the plea until the court has found . . . the defendant
10

understands the nature and elements of the offense to which the
plea is entered. . . . "
required.

Strict compliance with rule 11 is

State v. Hoff. 814 P.2d 1119, 1122 (Utah 1991).

A

trial court must "personally establish that the defendant's
guilty plea is truly knowing and voluntary and establish on
record

the

that the defendant knowingly waived his or her

constitutional rights and understood the elements of the crime."
State v. Abeyta. 852 P.2d 993, 995 (Utah 1993) (per curiam).

In

addition, the trial court must determine that the defendant
"'possesses an understanding of the law in relation to the
facts.'"

State v. Breckenridae. 688 P.2d 440, 444 (Utah 1983)

(quoting McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 466 (1969)).
However, the trial court is not "rigidly tied to the
colloquy with the defendant [or] relegated to rote recitation of
the rule 11 elements when entertaining a plea."

Abeyta, 852 P.2d

at 996 (citing State v. Maguire, 830 P.2d 216, 218 n.2 (Utah
1991) (per curiam)).
means.

The rule can be satisfied by multiple

See Maguire. 830 P.2d at 218.

The record on appeal

includes the contents of documents that have been properly
incorporated and those which are clearly part of the defendant's
knowledge and understanding.

Id. at n.2.

In determining whether

a defendant understands the factual elements of the crime
11

charged, it is proper to look at a "transcript of the oral
colloquy between the court and defendant, contents of a written
affidavit that the record reflects was read, understood, and
acknowledged by defendant and the court, contents of other
documents such as the information, presentence report, exhibits,
etc., similarly incorporated into the record, and so on."

Id. at

218.3
The record demonstrates that defendant understood the
factual elements of the crimes charged.

First, defendant is

charged with knowledge of the information based on his knowing
and intelligent waiver of its reading, both in the circuit and
district courts at time of arraignment, a matter unchallenged on
appeal (Crim. Tr. 4, 76). Further, defendant stated in the
affidavits he executed for each offense to which he plead that "I
have received a copy of the charge (Information) and understand
the crime . . . (R. 79, 84). The information provided defendant

3

See also State v. Thurman. 911 P.2d 371, 374 (Utah 1996)
(looking at defendant's plea affidavit and the plea colloquy
between defendant and the trial judge); Hoff, 814 P.2d at 1125
(looking at the information and probable cause statement);
Jolivet v. Cook, 784 P.2d 1148, 1150 (Utah 1989) (examining
testimony at preliminary hearing and reading of charges at
arraignment, as well as defendant's level of intelligence,
education, and understanding of the English language, in finding
pleas knowing and voluntary).
12

with notice that he was charged with, among other things,
criminal homicide/murder in the second degree and aggravated
robbery, both first degree felonies, and set out the elements of
each crime (Crim. Tr. 8 ) . The information also contained a
detailed probable cause statement describing the factual basis of
the charge, including the fact that defendant had shot Nielson at
close range with a 20-gauge sawed-off shotgun during the course
of a burglary or robbery (Crim. Tr. 10). Defendant was also
present at the preliminary hearing to hear the State's evidence
against him, including the testimony of co-defendant Rick Lewis
(See Crim. Tr. 4 ) ; cf. Jolivet, 784 P.2d at 1150 (finding it
significant that defendant attended the preliminary hearing at
which the victim testified in detail about the alleged crimes).
At the plea proceeding, defendant also signed affidavits
which set out the elements of manslaughter and robbery and the
facts supporting those elements (Crim. Tr. 79-88, attached at
Addendum B) .4 Each affidavit stated: U I have read this

4

The affidavit for manslaughter set out the following
elements and supporting facts:
Elements: That the defendant as a party to the offense
recklessly caused the death of another.
Facts: On October 31, 1987, at 111 South Allen Street,
Midvale, Utah; the defendant was a party to a robbery during
which, the victim of that robbery, Spencer Nielsen, was
killed.
13

Affidavit, or I have had it read to me by my attorney and I know
and understand its contents." (Crim. Tr. 81, 86). 5 Also
significant was the fact that defendant had his G.E.D., had
attended one year of college, and could read and understand
English (Crim. Tr. 81, 86); cf. Jolivet. 784 P.2d at 1150
(emphasizing defendant was of "above-average intelligence," had
completed two years of college, and understood the English
language).

The affidavits executed by defendant in open court

thus stated facts showing that he was informed of and understood
the elements of manslaughter and robbery.
Finally, the plea colloquy shows that defendant understood
the nature of the elements of both crimes (Crim Tr. 266-74,

(Crim. Tr. 79).
The affidavit for robbery set out the following elements and
supporting facts:
Elements: That the defendant as a party to the offense
unlawfully and intentionally took the property of another
from his immediate presence against his will and
accomplished this by means of force or fear.
Facts: On October 31, 1987, at 111 South Allen Street,
Midvale, Utah; the defendant took property from the
immediate presence of Spencer Nielsen by means of force or
fear.
(Crim. Tr. 84).
5

Both affidavits were also certified by defendant's
attorneys, certifying defendant had read the affidavit or had it
read to him and that his attorneys believed defendant fully
understood the meaning of its contents (Crim. Tr. 82, 87).
14

attached at Addendum C ) .

The trial court began by stating the

elements of manslaughter and the facts supporting that charge
(Crim Tr. 270). After confirming these with counsel, the court
asked defendant: "So then, as set out in this affidavit, are the
facts true and correct to the best of your knowledge?" (Crim. Tr.
271).

Defendant replied, "Yes, your Honor," and entered a no

contest plea (Crim. Tr. 271, 273-74).

The court then moved on to

recite the elements of robbery and the facts supporting that
charge (Crim. Tr. 271-72).

The court specifically asked

defendant: "Are those the facts, Mr. Penman?," to which defendant
replied, "Yes, Sir" (Crim. Tr. 272). The court then stated, "And
you understand the elements of both of those charges," and asked
defendant for his plea to robbery (Crim. Tr. 272).

Defendant

said: "That would be guilty, your Honor" (Crim. Tr. 272).
Lastly, the court asked defendant if he was entering a plea
because he did, in fact, commit robbery (Crim. Tr. 272).
Defendant said: "Yes.

I was a party to the offense of robbery;

yes, your Honor" (Crim. Tr. 272). Defendant then executed the
affidavits in open court (Crim. Tr. 272). The record thus shows
that the trial court strictly complied with rule ll.6

6

The record also demonstrates that the trial court
inquired into defendant's competency, his knowledge of his
15

Defendant claims that State v. Abeyta required the trial
court to engage him in a colloquy regarding the elements and that
its failure to do so was "improper."
However, defendant misreads Abeyta.

Appellant's Br. at 18.
In Abeyta, the supreme court

never reached "the issue of whether the elements of the offense
contained in the affidavit were sufficiently addressed" because
the trial court had not reached the merits of Abeyta's motion to
withdraw his guilty plea.

852 P.2d at 996.

Moreover, Utah law clearly demonstrates a trial court is not
required to personally discuss each element with the defendant.
Even if the trial judge makes no inquiry into the elements of the
offense charged and their relationship to the facts, the record
may still be sufficient to support the conclusion that the
defendant understood the elements of the crime and how those
elements related to the facts.

See Hoff. 814 P.2d at 1125

(citing State v. Jolivet. 784 P.2d 1148, 1150 (Utah 1989)).

For

example, in State v. Trujillo-Martinez. 814 P.2d 596 (Utah App.
1991), this Court held the trial court's failure to question
defendant during the colloquy as to whether he understood the

constitutional rights, his knowing waiver of those rights,
sentencing possibilities, and defendant's satisfaction with the
advice of his counsel (Crim. Tr. 268-69).
1€

nature and elements of his charge was not an abuse of discretion
since defendant's affidavit strictly complied with rule 11 and
the colloquy established defendant voluntarily and knowingly
signed the affidavit.

Id. at 600.

This Court has made it clear

that the trial court is only required to clarify "any omissions
or ambiguities" in defendant's affidavit as well as "any
uncertainties raised in the course of the plea colloquy."
v. Smith. 812 P.2d 470, 477 (Utah App. 1991).

State

The court "need

not repeat, verbatim, Rule 11 inquiries that are clearly posed
and answered in the affidavit, unless Rule 11 by its terms
specifically requires such repetition."

Id.; see also Maguire,

830 P.2d at 218 n.2 (refusing to require that all of the elements
of rule 11(5) be expressly addressed in the plea colloquy if they
are specified in the affidavit); Truiillo-Martinez. 814 P.2d at
599 (asserting the trial court need not perform a verbatim
recitation of each and every statement made in defendant's
affidavit).
Since defendant did not express any confusion or even ask
any questions regarding the elements or facts during the plea
colloquy, and his plea affidavits were unambiguous and complete,
the trial judge was not required to specifically discuss each

17

element with defendant.7

The trial court was certainly not

obligated to inform defendant "that his pleas would result in his
being treated as a murderer," as defendant suggests.

Appellant's

Br. at 10.

POINT 11
DEFENDANT WAS NOT DENIED EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF
COUNSEL WHEN HE VOLUNTARILY AND KNOWINGLY AGREED TO A
PLEA BARGAIN
Defendant claims his pleas were involuntary because he was
denied his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of
counsel during the preparatory stages of his case and when he

7

Defendant claims the phrase "a party to the offense of
robbery during the commission of which, the victim of that
robbery . . . was killed" is ambiguous in that it did not convey
to him "that he was admitting to the act of killing or to being
an accessory to murder." Appellant's Br. at 17. However, the
statement of the elements in defendant's affidavit for
manslaughter made it sufficiently clear he was admitting to
n
caus[ing] the death of another" as a party to the offense of
robbery (Crim. Tr. 79). The plea is consistent with the
information, in which defendant was charged not only with
intentionally and knowingly murdering the victim, but also with
"caus[ing] the death of Spencer Neilson," during the "commission
. . . of aggravated robbery . . . , " both variants of first
degree felony murder (Crim. Tr. 8 ) . Defendant's no contest plea
to manslaughter, a second degree felony, is plainly the result of
the State's inability to prove that defendant was the actual
murderer, acknowledged by the prosecutor at the plea hearing (R.
266-67).
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entered his pleas.8

Appellant's Br. at 20.

Defendant

specifically contends that his trial counsel performed
ineffectively by (1) acting in collusion with the prosecutor by
entering into a "fraudulent" stipulation that Johnston had been
subpoenaed, and (2) failing to inform him and the court that Rick
Lewis had committed perjury and was testifying pursuant to an
immunity agreement, or in the alternative, tnat she failed to
investigate and learn of these facts.

Appellant's Br. at 20.

Defendant also argues he would not have entered pleas to robbery
and manslaughter if he was made aware of three pieces of

8

In connection with his claim of ineffective assistance,
see Appellant's Br. at Poir.i II, defendant also asserts he was
denied "the substantial right of preliminary examination into the
charges." Appellant's Br. at 20. However, defendant cites no
legal authority in support of this point at Point II, and only
cursory reference to unsupportive authority at Point IV,
challenging the trial court's brief. Because defendant makes no
substantive legal argument on this point, this Court should
refuse to address it. See State v. Amicone, 689 P.2d 1341, 1344
(Utah 1984) (declining to rule on arguments which defendant fails
to support by any legal analysis or authority). Furthermore,
since this appeal is only from the trial court's denial of
defendant's motion to withdraw his pleas, a motion which did not
challenge the propriety of the preliminary examination, this
issue is not properly before this Court. See Penman v. Carver.
No. 960639-CA (Utah App. April 25, 1996)(memorandum decision
directing reentry of trial court order denying motion to withdraw
pleas) (R. 338-40). Notwithstanding defendant's insur^icient
briefing, the State has briefly addressed this claim in
connection with defendant's challenge to the trial court's
jurisdiction, see Appellant's Br. at Point IV, at Point III of
this brief.
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"exculpatory" information: (1) the results of an FBI ballistics
report; (2) a sworn statement given to the State by Rick Lewis;
and (3) information that Johnston had not been subpoenaed and
that no arrest warrant had been issued for him.
at 21-24.

Appellant's Br.

However, this Court need not reach all of defendant's

claims because the record is inadequate to resolve them, and
further, defendant has waived this argument.

Defendant's claim

also fails on the merits because defendant cannot meet either
prong of the Hill v. Lockhart test.
When ineffectiveness claims are raised for the first time on
appeal, they will only be reviewed "if the trial record is
adequate to permit decision of the issue and defendant is
represented by counsel other than trial counsel."
Humphries. 818 P.2d 1027, 1029 (Utah 1991).

State v.

" [P]roof of

ineffective assistance of counsel cannot be a speculative matter
but must be a demonstrable reality."
870, 877 (Utah 1993).

Fernandez v. Cook, 870 P.2d

In this case, defendant has failed to make

part of the record a transcript of the preliminary hearing,
necessary to determine whether defendant's counsel failed to
cross—examine Lewis as to his agreement with the prosecutor or
whether the prosecutor failed to disclose Lewis's agreement to
the court, or any record evidence that either his counsel or the
20

prosecutor knew that Johnston had not

been subpoenaed.9

Defendant's claims that defense counsel knew of allegedly
exculpatory evidence and did not convey that information to him
are purely speculative and are not supported with demonstrable
proof.

This Court should therefore refuse to address defendant's

ineffective assistance claim on appeal.
Moreover, when defendant knowingly and voluntarily pleaded
no contest to manslaughter and guilty to robbery, he waived all
nonjurisdictional defects, including any Sixth Amendment
violations.

It is well-settled that a knowing and voluntary plea

constitutes a waiver of "all nonjurisdictional defects, including
pre-plea constitutional violations."

See. e.g.. State v.

9

An appellate court will uas — the regularity of the
proceedings below when appellant fa
to provide an adequate
record on appeal." State v. Blubaugh. 904 P.2d 6c. , 69S- lUtah
App. 1995), cert, denied. 913 P.2d 749 (Utah 1996) (citing
Jolivet v. Cook, 784 P.2d 1148, 1150 (Utah 1989)).
When a defendant predicates error to [an appellate court],
he has the duty and responsibility of supporting such
allegation by an adequate record. Absent that record,
defendant's assignment of error stands as a unilateral
allegation which the review court has no power to determine.
This Court simply cannot rule on a question which depends
for its existence upon alleged facts unsupported by the
record.
State v. Wulffenstein. 657 P.2d 289, 293 (Utah 1982) (citations
omitted).
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Parsons, 781 P.2d 1275, 1278 (Utah 1989); State v. Sery. 758 P.2d
935, 938 (Utah App. 1988).

This Court should thus decline to

address defendant's ineffectiveness claim because, in addition to
providing an inadequate record, the defendant waived this
argument below when he entered knowing and voluntary pleas.
Even if this Court considers defendant's Sixth Amendment
claim on the merits, his argument fails because he has not met
either prong of the Hill v. Lockhart test.

In determining

whether counsel is constitutionally ineffective, Utah courts
employ the two-part test established in Hill v. Lockhart, 474
U.S. 52 (1985).

See e.g., Parsons. 872 P.2d at 525.

To prevail

on an ineffective assistance claim, a defendant must show: (1)
"that his counsel rendered a deficient performance in some
demonstrable manner, which performance fell below an objective
standard of reasonable professional judgment"; and (2) "that
counsel's performance prejudiced the defendant."

Parsons v.

Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 521 (Utah 1994)(quoting Bundy v. Deland,
763 P.2d 803, 805 (Utah 1988)(citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at
687).

Unless this Court finds that defendant was prejudiced by

his trial counsel's performance, it "need not decide whether that
performance was deficient."

State v. Arguelles, 921 P.2d 43 9,
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441 (Utah 1996) (citing Strickland. 466 U.S. at 697). 10
A.

Defendant has not Shown he was Prejudiced bv his
CQifflgel'fr Performance.

"Where a defendant challenges a guilty plea on grounds of
ineffective assistance of counsel, he or she must show

x

a

reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he [or
she] would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on
going to trial."'

Parsons. 871 P.2d at 525 (quoting Hill v.

Lockhart. 474 U.S.at 59).

"Legal representation that is

'unprofessional in one case may be sound or even brilliant in
another.'"

Parsons, 871 P.2d at 522 (quoting Strickland.

466

U.S. at 693). The prejudice component of the Strickland test
therefore requires a defendant to establish a nexus between
counsel's deficient performance and the reliability of the plea
process in order to prevent potential windfalls to the defendant,
see id.. and to "serve the fundamental interest in the finality
of guilty pleas."
at 370.

Hill v. Lockhart. 474 U.S. at 58, 106 S. Ct.

Defendant's claim "may not be speculative, but must be a

10

Prejudice is first addressed because it embraces both
the State's responses to defendant's claim that his counsel
performed ineffectively and that the prosecutor failed to turn
over exculpatory evidence under Brady v. Maryland. 373 U.S. 83
(1963) . Indeed, as subsequently argued, defense counsel did
perform effectively.
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demonstrable reality."
1986).

State v. Frame, 723 P.2d 401, 405 (Utah

"It is not enough to claim that the alleged errors had

some conceivable effect on the outcome or could have had a
prejudicial effect on the fact finders."
1.

Id.

The State did not fail to disclose material
exculpatory information.

Prosecutors have an affirmative constitutional duty to
disclose material evidence that would tend to exculpate the
accused.

See United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 107, 96 S. Ct.

2392, 2399 (1976); Brady. 373 U.S. at 104; State v. Carter. 707
P.2d 656, 662 (Utah 1985).

Disclosure is only mandatory when the

evidence is (1) exculpatory and (2) material to the issue of
guilt.
There is no duty to disclose non-exculpatory information.
See State v. Mickelson, 848 P.2d 677, 689 n.16 (Utah App. 1992).
"Exculpatory" evidence is that which "tends to justify, excuse or
clear the defendant from alleged fault or guilt."
Dictionary 566 (6th ed. 1991).

Black's Law

"The materiality required to

reverse a criminal conviction for suppression or destruction or
evidence . . .

is more than evidentiary materiality."

Nebeker. 657 P.2d 1359, 1363 (Utah 1983).
material in the constitutional sense.
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Id.

State v.

The evidence must be
"Constitutional

materiality" requires
there be a showing that the suppressed or destroyed
evidence is vital to the issues of whether the defendant
is guilty of the charge and whether there is a fundamental
unfairness that requires the Court to set aside the
defendant's conviction. . . . "The mere
possibility
that an item of undisclosed information might have
helped the defense or might have affected the outcome
of the trial does not establish 'materiality' in the
constitutional sense."
State v. Lovato. 702 P.2d 101, 106 (Utah 1985) (quoting Agurs.
427 U.S. at 109-10).

There is thus

VM

no constitutional

requirement that the prosecutor make a complete and detailed
accounting to the defense of all police investigatory work on a
case,'" State v. Workman. 635 P.2d 49, 52 (Utah 1981) (quoting
Moore v. Illinois. 408 U.S. 786, 92 S. Ct. 2562 (1972)), or that
he or she "'disclose any and all information which may assist
said defendant in preparing for trial.'"
Horn. 610 P.2d 551 (Idaho 1980)).

Id. (quoting State v.

As the court said in State v.

A fair-minded prosecutor is not likely to be aware
of all potential evidence which a defendant may think
relevant, and we do not think it reasonable, given the
adversary nature of the criminal process, to require a
prosecutor to disclose all evidence which might possibly
be useful to the defense but which is not likely to have
a foreseeable effect upon the verdict. Such a requirement
would create unbearable burdens and also uncertainties
with respect to the finality of judgments.
608 P.2d 218, 225 (Utah 1980).
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Defendant bears the burden of proving that the information
sought was both exculpatory and material.

See State v. Worthen.

765 P.2d 839, 850 (Utah 1988) (rejecting defendant's claim that
the prosecutor withheld exculpatory witness interviews, absent
some evidence that the interviews had taken place and were
exculpatory).

If the prosecution does not disclose requested

information to the defense, it is appropriate to conclude, absent
some showing to the contrary, that the prosecution possessed no
exculpatory records with regard to the request.
P.2d at 52 n.22 (citation omitted).

Workman. 635

"To do otherwise would be to

impugn the prosecution's conduct on no more than the strength of
appellants' unsupported accusations--an act [this Court]
certainly would chose to avoid."

a.

Results

Id.

of the Ballistics

Tests

As a preliminary matter, any claims regarding the results of
the ballistics test are not properly before the Court in this
appeal.

As noted above, defendant's appeal is properly taken

only from the trial court's denial of his motion to withdraw his
pleas.

Defendant's claims regarding the results of ballistics

tests were not addressed in his motion to withdraw his pleas, but
rather only in his petition for writ of habeas corpus (Crim Tr.
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14 9-163; see [Defendant's Memorandum in] Opposition to
Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment, R.
41).

220, 225-26, 240-

Therefore, the Court should decline to consider these

claims.
Even considering defendant's claims, defendant has failed to
meet his burden to show that the results of the ballistics tests
were exculpatory or not turned over to defendant.

The results

could only be characterized as inconclusive or inculpatory.
Following the robbery and homicide, Wyoming authorities recovered
several 20-gauge shotgun shells from Johnston's truck and from
defendant's pockets (R. 78). These shells were later sent to the
FBI Laboratory for analysis, where they were compared with one
shotshell wad and one hundred pellets recovered from the victim's
body (R. 240). A 20-gauge Stevens sawed-off shotgun was also
examined (R. 241). The results of the FBI's examination were:
(1) The shotshell wad recovered from the victim was
consistent in appearance with the type of wad commercially
loaded by Fiocchi into shotshells like those recovered from
the defendant's pockets and Johnston's vehicle.
(2) The 100 pellets recovered from the victim are nickelplated lead pellets, consistent with No. 6 shot. The
shotshells recovered from defendant and Johnston's vehicle
were commercially loaded with nickel-plated No. 6 shot.
(3) No conclusion could be reached as to whether the
shotshells recovered from defendant's pockets and Johnston's
vehicle were ever loaded into the 2 0-gauge shotgun.
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(4) When a representative sample of the 100 pellets
recovered from the victim was compared with a representative
sample of the pellets from the shotshells recovered from
defendant's pocket and Johnson's vehicle, "close
compositional associations were found." These results
suggested the pellets could have originated from shotshells
found within the same box, or could have originated
from different boxes of shotshells of the same type and
manufacturer that were packaged on or about the same date.
(See R. 241; attached at Addendum D ) .
These results are clearly not exculpatory.
they tended to incriminate the defendant.

On the contrary,

Therefore, the

prosecution was under no duty to disclose them.

See Workman. 635

P.2d at 53 (holding prosecutor had no constitutional duty to
disclose content of statements that were inculpatory or "not
susceptible of an interpretation that would in any way give rise
to a reasonable doubt of guilt").

Furthermore, evidence is

generally "not improperly withheld if the defense has knowledge
of that evidence and defense counsel simply fails to request it."
Jarrell. 608 P.2d at 225 (citations omitted).

Defense counsel

was or should have been aware that the shotshells and rifle had
been sent to the FBI for analysis because the State's response to
defendant's discovery request included the letter accompanying
the evidence to the lab (See "Evidence letter to the F.B.I, from
Detective Jerry Thompson dated January 29, 1988," Crim. Tr. 33).
It is thus appropriate to assume defendant, or at least his
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attorney, knew such tests were being conducted.

In any event,

any alleged failure by the prosecutor to volunteer the FBI's
report was not improper.
Jb.

The Sworn Statement

Given by Rick

Lewis

Defendant asserts that the State failed to disclose
documents which established that Rick Lewis had an immunity
agreement with the State.

Appellant's Br. at 22. Evidence

impeaching the credibility of a key government witness falls
under the Brady rule and must be disclosed to the defense.
United States v. Baaley. 473 U.S. 667, 676-77 (1985); Giglio v.
United States. 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972).

However, as the

criminal record indicates, Lewis's statement was turned over to
defendant on April 12, 1988 in response to his request for
discovery (See Crim. Tr. 33, 40).
c.

Johnston's

Subpoena

Defendant claims to have proof that Johnston was not served
a subpoena.

Appellant's Br. at 7, 9, 22. However, defendant has

no proof at all.

The court minute entry responding to his

request for a copy of Johnston's subpoena simply states: "The
Court is unable to locate a subpoena issued for Monte Dean
Johnston." (R. 106). This does not mean that Johnston was never
served with a subpoena, but only that the Court has no record of
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one.

Based on the record it is probable that a subpoena was

issued, but that the return was inadvertently not entered in the
file, and that Johnston was served with a subpoena, but chose not
to appear.
Additionally, according to a letter from the prosecutor to
the Board of Pardons, Johnston was in fact served with a subpoena
before the preliminary hearing and prior to absconding (R. 80).
Defense counsel also stipulated during the preliminary hearing
that Johnston was subpoenaed and that if the authorities who
served Johnston were called, they would testify that Johnston was
served a subpoena to testify in the matter (Crim. Tr. 203).
Finally, whether or not Johnston was subpoenaed is
immaterial to the question of defendant's guilt.

State v.

Stewart, 544 P.2d 477, 479 (Utah 1975) (evidence that is not
"vital" to the issue of the defendant's guilt or innocence need
not be disclosed).

In response to discovery requests (Crim. Tr.

2 9-30), the prosecutor evidently turned over all statements made
by Johnston to several investigators, including a polygraph
examination of Johnston (Crim. Tr.
2.

33, 35, 40).

Defendant has failed to show he would have
insisted on proceeding to trial if he was aware of
this information.

Defendant has not made the requisite showing of prejudice
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and thus cannot prevail on his claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel.

As discussed above, defendant's claims that exculpatory

and material evidence was withheld from him are unsupported by
the record.

Defendant has further failed to provide the

demonstrable proof that is required to support an ineffectiveness
claim.

See Frame, 723 P.2d at 405.

Defendant has not provided

this Court with any record evidence that defense counsel "acted
in collusion with the prosecutor/' see Appellant's Br. at 20, and
he has not shown that he was prejudiced in any way by counsel's
actions or inaction.
Specifically, defendant has failed to show that his counsel
did not stipulate in good faith, based on the prosecutorss
representation, that Johnston had been subpoenad.

More

particularly, he has failed to show that Johnston's absence "may
deprived him of the opportunity to show that another and not the
defendant committed the crime in question."
27.

Appellant's Br. at

Indeed, the term "may" shows that defendant's claim is

merely speculative.

In fact, all evidence tends to show that

Johnston's presence at the preliminary hearing would have been
damaging, since only he claimed that defendant had actually shot
the victim (Crim. Tr. 202).
Defendant's claim that he would not have entered his pleas
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if he had known that Lewis was testifying pursuant to a promise
of immunity is not credible.

On January 26, 1988, the prosecutor

filed an affidavit in which he stated that Lewis would not be
charged in exchange for his testimony (Crim. Tr. 17, 18). Also,
as indicated above, in response to a discovery request the
prosecutor turned over Lewis's recorded statement in which the
immunity agreement, as then contemplated, was explicitly
discussed (Crim. Tr. 33, 40). On April 21, defense counsel
acknowledged her receipt of the discovery documents and Lewis's
immunity, using it as a basis for requesting a continuance of the
preliminary hearing in order to prepare (Crim. Tr. 41).

In

connection with his counsel's motion, defendant signed on May 11,
a waiver of his time in which to be brought to trial, almost five
months before he pleaded (Crim. Tr. 48). More significantly,
defense counsel stated during the plea hearing that "we
understand [that Lewis] is going to enter a plea to a seconddegree felony in this case, not a homicide" (Crim. Tr. 277). lx
These facts indicate that defendant was aware that Lewis had been
offered some kind of deal in exchange for his testimony long

11

It would appear from Lewis f s being charged that Lewis
may have breached the immunity agreement before he testified at
the preliminary hearing.
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before he pleaded.
As discussed above, the results of the ballistics test were
either inconclusive or inculpatory, and therefore, along with
defendant's other purported reasons, provide no credible grounds
for the withdrawal of the pleas.
Moreover, there were many valid reasons for defendant to
accept the State's plea bargain.

For instance, defendant

received substantial benefits in exchange for pleading guilty to
robbery and no contest to manslaughter.

The remaining counts

against defendant, including one count of aggravated rurglary, a
first degree felony, and two counts of theft, both second degree
felonies, were dismissed (Crim. Tr. 266-68) .

Additionally,

defendant was able to plead to the lesser included offenses of
robbery and manslaughter (R. 267).

In exchange for defendant's

pleas the prosecutor also agreed not to object to defendant's
request that the sentences run concurrently, and the prosecutor
made good his promise to send a letter to the Board of Pardons
addressing the State's inability to prove defendant was the
actual perpetrator of the homicide (Crim. Tr. 266-67, 274; see
also letter, Crim. Tr. 200-04) .
Finally, the State apparently had a strong case against
defendant and could have easily tried defendant on all five of
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the original charges.

A defendant may legitimately choose to

plead guilty, even though he maintains his innocence, because he
would otherwise face a serious risk of conviction if he proceeded
to trial.

See Willett v. Barnes. 842 P.2d 860, 862 (Utah 1992).

In this case, the State had Lewis as a witness implicating
defendant in the robbery and homicide.

It also had physical

evidence linking defendant to the crime, such as the 20-gauge
shotgun shells recovered from defendant's pockets and the
oriental artifacts, identical to those stolen from the victim,
found in defendant's vehicle.

There was thus no "reasonable

probability" that defendant would not have entered into the plea
agreement even if he was aware of the three documents he claims
to have had no prior knowledge of.
B.

Defendant has not Demonstrated that Trial Counsel's
Performance F$ll B ^ I Q W an Objective Standard of
Reasonableness.

Since defendant has failed to demonstrate prejudice, this
Court need not reach the issue of whether trial counsel's
representation was deficient.

However, if addressed, it becomes

apparent that defendant cannot meet the first prong of the Hill
v. Lockhart test either.
In order to overcome "the strong presumption that counsel
rendered adequate assistance and exercised 'reasonable
34

professional judgment,'" a defendant must prove that "specific,
identified acts or omissions fall outside the wide range of
professionally competent assistance."

Frame, 723 P.2d at 405

(quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 668, 104 S. Ct. at 2066).

In

other words, a defendant must show the challenged action could
not be considered "sound trial strategy."
524.

Parsons, 871 P.2d at

There are a "'variety of circumstances faced by defense

counsel [and a] range of legitimate decisions regarding how best
to represent a criminal defendant.7" State v. Templin, 805 P.2d
182, 186 (Utah 1990) (quoting Strickland. 466 U.S. at 689). And,
u

[t]he object of an ineffectiveness claim is not to grade

counsel's performance."
at 2069.

Strickland. 466 U.S. at 697, 104 S. Ct.

Therefore, courts "will not review counsel's tactical

decisions simply because another lawyer, e.g., appellate counsel,
would have taken a different course."

State v. Jones. 823 P.2d

1059, 1063 (Utah 1991).
Defendant has failed to overcome the presumption that his
representation below was inadequate.

As stated above, defendant

has not shown that his counsel was ineffective in stipulating
that Johnston had been subpoenaed or that there was good reason
to have Johnston testify at the preliminary hearing.

Second,

although defense counsel was aware that prior to the preliminary
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hearing Lewis had apparently been granted immunity, her failure
to impeach Lewis at the preliminary hearing may have merely been
a matter of strategic choice.

Indeed, counsel might reasonably

have thought that if Lewis's credibility was unchallenged, the
court might not have bound defendant over on the murder charge
since Lewis testified that it was Johnston who physically abused
the victim and that he thought that it was Johnston who shot the
victim (Crim. Tr. 160). Third, defense counsel could not have
performed ineffectively concerning the results of ballistics
tests that evidently had not yet been completed at the time of
the preliminary hearing.
Further, one factor that has been used in determining
whether counsel's advice to plead guilty was part of a legitimate
trial strategy is whether the defendant "received benefits that
were meaningful to him in exchange for his plea."

Parsons, 871

P.2d at 524; see also State vT Gardner, 844 P.2d 293, 297-98
(Utah 1992).

As mentioned above, defendant received substantial

benefits in exchange for his pleas to manslaughter and robbery.
The State reduced two first degree felony counts to second degree
felonies and dismissed three other felony charges (R. 267). The
prosecutor also agreed not ask for consecutive sentences and even
promised to send a letter to the Board of Pardons on defendant's
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behalf (R. 266, 274). Defense counsel's advice to defendant to
plead to the reduced charges was thus part of a legitimate, and
indeed sound, trial strategy.

Defendant has failed to offer

proof of any specific acts which fell outside the wide scope of
effective representation.
In sum, the trial court correctly denied defendant's motion
to withdraw his pleas.
(1995),

w

Under Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6 (2) (a)

[a] plea of guilty or no contest may be withdrawn only

upon good cause shown. . . . "

A trial court's failure to

strictly comply with rule 11 in accepting a plea is good cause,
as a matter of law, for the withdrawal of that plea.

Smith, 812

P.2d at 476 (citing State v. Vasilacopulos. 756 P.2d 92, 95 (Utah
App. 1988) . However, as demonstrated above, the trial court
strictly complied with rule 11, and defendant's pleas were both
voluntary and knowing.

Therefore, defendant has failed to

establish the "good cause" necessary to warrant a withdrawal of
his pleas and the trial court's denial of his motion should
accordingly be affirmed.
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POINT III
BECAUSE DEFENDANT WAIVED HIS RIGHTS UNDER THE
INTERSTATE AGREEMENT ON DETAINERS, AND BECAUSE THERE
WERE NO PREJUDICIAL DEFECTS IN THE PRELIMINARY HEARING,
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY OBTAINED JURISDICTION OVER
DEFENDANT
Defendant argues that because he involuntarily waived his
rights for a 180-day disposition of detainers under the
Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD)12 and because the
preliminary hearing was tainted by the prosecutor's failure to
disclose to the trial court that Lewis was testifying under a
grant of immunity, the district never obtained jurisdiction over
him, all of which constitutes good cause for withdrawing his
pleas.
A.

Appellant's Br. at 25-27.

The claims are without merit.

Because Defendant Did Not Raise Either of His Claims
in His Motion to Withdraw His Pleas, this Court Should
Decline to Consider them.

As noted in Points I and II of this brief, this Court's
reversal of Judge Bohling's ruling provided only for an appeal
from the trial court's denial of defendant's motion to withdraw
his pleas.

Because defendant did not raise either of his claims

in his motion to withdraw his pleas, the trial court did not deny
the motion based on its assessment of those claims.

12

Therefore,

£££ Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-5 (1995) (attached at
Addendum A ) .
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this court should decline to consider them.
B.

Defendant Properly Waived His Rights to a Swift
Disposition of the Charges Under the Interstate

Agreement pp. pgtfri-nerg t
Defendant specifically claims that he must knowingly,
intelligently and voluntarily choose not to enjoy the rights
afforded by the IAD in order to waive those rights.
Br. at 25.

Appellant's

However, this assertion is directly contrary to this

Court's holding in State v. Smith, 833 P.2d 371 (Utah App. 1992),
which established that all that is required for a waiver of
rights under the IAD is a voluntary plea.

Id. at 372.

The plea

itself need not contain an express, knowing, and intelligent
waiver in order to properly waive nonjurisdictional issues.
State v. Brocksmith. 888 P.2d 703, 706 (Utah App. 1994).
The protections afforded under the IAD are not
jurisdictional in nature, and as such, can be waived like any
other nonjurisdictional error.

Id. at 705.

A defendant waives

his IAD rights when he voluntarily enters an unconditional plea.
Id.; see also Smith. 833 P.2d at 372.

As demonstrated above,

defendant's pleas were made voluntarily.
were unconditional.

In addition, his pleas

Defendant's affidavit for his no contest

plea to manslaughter expressly stated:
(5)

I know that under the constitution of Utah that if I
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were tried and convicted by a jury or by the Judge that I
would have a right to appeal my conviction and sentence to
the Supreme Court of Utah for review of the trial
proceedings....
(6) I know and understand that by entering a plea of no
contest I am giving up my constitutional rights as set out
in the preceding paragraphs.

(10) I understand that although I am pleading no contest
that plea is of the same force and effect as pleading guilty
and that my plea of no contest will be treated the same as a
guilty plea.
(Crim. Tr. 80-81, attached at Addendum B ) .

Defendant's affidavit

for his guilty plea to robbery repeated verbatim defendant's
understanding and knowing abandonment of his constitutional
rights (Crim. Tr. 85, attached at Addendum B ) .

Additionally, the

trial judge engaged defendant in the following colloquy:
THE COURT:
Now, you understand by entering a plea of
guilty to Count 1, Criminal Manslaughter, a second-degree
felony; and Count 2, Robbery, a second-degree felony, that
you will be giving up certain constitutional rights, such as
. . . a right to appeal if convicted? Do you understand
that?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Sir.
MS. PALACIOS: Your Honor, that's a no contest to the -THE COURT: Yes. I understand it's a no contest.
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
THE COURT: But, nevertheless, you are giving up all those
rights; and you will actually be giving all those rights up.
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Sir.
(R. 268-69; attached at Addendum C ) .
Defendant also expressly waived his rights under the IAD by
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requesting a delay in order to prepare his defense.13

If the

defendant himself is the cause of a delayed prosecution beyond
the 120-day prosecution period established in Article IV(c) of
the IAD, the defendant cannot assert the delay as a basis for
dismissal of the charges against him.

See State v. Jensen, 818

P.2d 551, 552-53 (Utah 1991); State v. Stillings. 709 P.2d 348,
349 (Utah 1985).

Defendant claims he waived his rights "under

the false premise that efforts were being made to locate his
accuser (Monte Johnson) and that preparations were being made on
his behalf and in his defense." (R. 14-15).

However, again,

defendant has failed to provide proof that such efforts were not
in fact being made.

Furthermore, requesting a delay in order to

prepare his defense was certainly a legitimate reason for
defendant to waive his right to a speedy prosecution.

13

Defendant was arraigned in the circuit court on April 5,
1988 (Crim. Tr. 3 ) , and the trial court entered defendant's pleas
on October 28, 1988, the intervening period being 2 06 days.
Defendant waived his rights under the IAD beginning April 21,
1988 until the preliminary hearing (Crim. Tr. 3 ) . At the
preliminary hearing he again waived his rights until motions
could be briefed and argued on July 21 (Crim. Tr. 4 ) . On July
22, he again waived his rights, without any limitation appearing
on the record (Crim. Tr. 4 ) . Even if this last express waiver
were only until he was arraigned in the district court, to wit:
August 8, then defendant would have waived 109 days, 23 days less
than time in which he had to be brought to trial.
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C.
Anv Claim of Defect at the Preliminary Hearing
Has Been Waived and is. in any Case, Without Merit,
Defendant waived his claims that the prosecutor's failure to
disclose at the preliminary hearing any agreements he might have
had with Lewis in exchange for his testimony when defendant
pleaded no contest to manslaughter and guilty to robbery.

See

Parsons, 781 P.2d at 1278 (knowing and voluntary plea constitutes
a waiver of "all nonjurisdictional defects, including pre-plea
constitutional violations").

Further, as noted at Point II

above, defendant has failed to include in the record on appeal a
transcript of the preliminary hearing, necessary to show that the
prosecutor failed to correct Lewis's purported testimony
concerning any agreements he might have negotiated with the
prosecutor.

See Blubaugh. 904 P.2d at 699 ("assum[ing] the

regularity of the proceedings below when appellant fails to
provide an adequate record on appeal").

Moreover, defendant has

failed to supply any relevant legal authority for the proposition
that a district court loses jurisdiction over a case if there is
a defect in the preliminary hearing. See Amicone, 689 P.2d at
1344 (declining to rule on arguments which defendant fails to
support by any legal analysis or authority).

Indeed, such

authority as defendant cites rather supports the State's position
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that any defect in a preliminary hearing is nonjurisdictional and
is waived by the entry of a knowing and voluntary plea.

See

Coleman v. Burnett. 477 F.2d 1187, 1194 (D.C.Cir 1973)(holding
that a defective preliminary examination before a federal
magistrate should be corrected in the federal district court,
rather than nullifying the bindover);14 cf. State v. Ouas, 83 7
P.2d 565, 566 (Utah App. 1992)(holding challenge to bindover
mooted once a defendant has been convicted beyond a reasonable
doubt)(citing State v. Humphrey. 823 P.2d 464, 466 n.6 (Utah
1991))-

Thus, as with defendant's ineffectiveness claim, this

Court should thus decline to address defendant's attack on the
adequacy of his preliminary examination.
Even considering defendant's claim, it is without merit.

It

would appear that the prosecutor offered Lewis immunity from all
prosecution prior to February 4, 1988, in exchange for truthful
testimony (Crim. Tr. at 33, 207-10).

14

At the plea hearing, more

In Coleman, the federal circuit court reversed only that
portion of the district court's judgment denying a requested
declaration that the preliminary hearing was rendered defective
by the magistrate's refusal to allow a subpoena commanding the
appearance of a witness. 477 F.2d at 1212. Thus, Coleman is
hardly even relevant to defendant's additional, though unfounded,
claim that the preliminary hearing was defective because the
prosecutor failed to reveal that Johnston had not been
subpoenaed.
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than eight months later, however, Lewis was evidently expected to
plead guilty to a second-degree felony (Crim. Tr. 277). Thus, it
is not at all clear from the scanty record provided that Lewis
was testifying pursuant to the original agreement for immunity,
but rather had broken the agreement and was testifying pursuant
to a new arrangement, or no arrangement at all.
Even if the prosecutor failed to disclose to the trial court
an agreement following Lewis's denial of any promise as to the
disposition of possible charges against him, it would not
constitute reversible error where there is nothing to suggest
that the circuit court, even knowing of Lewis's possible
immunity, would not have bound over defendant.

Cf. State v.

Johnson, 774 P.2d 1141, 1147 (Utah 1989)(concluding that any
misstatement in the prosecutor's closing statement concerning a
key witness's immunity was not prejudicial considering the weight
of evidence of guilt); State v. Leonard, 707 P.2d 650, 656 (Utah
1985)(noting that the mere grant of immunity does not by itself
supply the jury with sufficient information to assess the
witness's bias).
Lewis implicated defendant in the robbery and homicide.
Oriental artifacts, identical to those stolen from the victim,
were found in defendant's vehicle, and 20-gauge shotgun shells
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consistent with those used in the murder were found in
defendant's pockets.

Thus, there was more than sufficient

evidence to support the bindover.

See State v. Pledger, 896 P.2d

1226, 1229 (Utah 1995) (in determining whether there is probable
cause, magistrate should view evidence in light most favorable to
prosecution and resolve all inferences in favor of prosecution,
and unless evidence is wholly lacking and incapable of reasonable
inference to prove some issue which supports prosecutor's claim,
magistrate should bind defendant over for trial—standard of proof
is lower than preponderance).
In sum, defendant fails to show that there was any defect in
the preliminary hearing sufficient to deprive the trial court of
jurisdiction in accepting his no contest and guilty pleas.
CONCLUSION
Fot

the reasons stated above, this Court should affirm the

trial court's denial of defendant's motion to withdraw his pleas.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this -2jf

day of July, 1997.

KENNETH A. BRONSTON
Assistant Attorney General
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Snow, Christensen & Martineau, 10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor,
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145, this ^
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day of July, 1997.

ADDENDA

ADDENDUM A

Rule 11. Pleas.
(a) Upon arraignment, except for an infraction, a defendant shall be represented by counsel, unless the defendant waives counsel in open court. The
defendant shall not be required to plead until the defendant has had a reasonable time to confer with counsel.
(b) A defendant may plead not guilty, guilty, no contest, not guilty by
reason of insanity, or guilty and mentally ill. A defendant may plead in the
alternative not guilty or not guilty by reason of insanity. If a defendant refuses to plead or if a defendant corporation fails to appear, the court shall
enter a plea of not guilty.
(c) A defendant may plead no contest only with the consent of the court.
(d) When a defendant enters a plea of not guilty, the case shall forthwith be
set for trial. A defendant unable to make bail shall be given a preference for
an early trial. In cases other than felonies the court shall advise the defendant, or counsel, of the requirements for making a written demand for a jury
trial.
(e) The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and
mentally ill, and may not accept the plea until the court has found:
(1) if the defendant is not represented by counsel, he or she has knowingly waived the right to counsel and does not desire counsel;
(2) the plea is voluntarily made;
(3) the defendant knows of the right to the presumption of innocence,
the right against compulsory self-incrimination, the right to a speedy
public trial before as impartial jnry, the right to confront and cross-examine in open court the prosecution witnesses, the right to compel the attendance of defense witnesses, and that by entering the plea, these rights are
waived;
(4) the defendant understands the nature and elements of the offense to
which the plea is entered, that upon trial the prosecution would have the
burden of proving each of those elements beyond a reasonable doubt, and
that the plea is an admission of all those elements;
(5) the defendant knows the minimum and wifiwuw sentence, and if
applicable, the minimum mandatory nature of the minimum sentence,
that may be imposed for each offense to which a plea is entered, including
the possibility of the imposition of consecutive sentences;
(6) if the tendered plea is a result of a prior plea discussion and plea
agreement, and if so, what agreement has been reached;
(7) the defendant has been advised of the time limits for filing any
motion to withdraw the plea; and
(8) the defendant has been advised that the right of appeal is limited.
(f) Failure to advise the defendant of the time limits forfilingany motion to
withdraw a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and mentally ill is not a ground
for setting the plea aside, but may be the ground for extending the time to
make a motion under Section 77-13-6.
(g) (1) If it appears that the prosecuting attorney or any other party has
agreed to request or recommend the acceptance of a plea to a lesser included offense, or the dismissal of other charges, the agreement •hall be
approved by the court
(2) If sentencing recommendations are allowed by the court, the court
shall advise the defendant personally that any recommendation as to
sentence is not binding on the court

(h) (1) The judge shall not participate in plea discussions prior to any plea
agreement being made by the prosecuting attorney.
(2) When a tentative plea agreement has been reached, the judge, upon
request of the parties, may permit the disclosure of the tentative agreement and the reasons for it, in advance of the time for tender of the plea.
The judge may then indicate to the prosecuting attorney and defense
counsel whether the proposed disposition will be approved.
(3) If the judge then decides that final disposition should not be in
conformity with the plea agreement, the judge shall advise the defendant
and then call upon the defendant to either affirm or withdraw the plea.
(i) With approval of the court and the consent of the prosecution, a defendant may enter a conditional plea of guilty* guilty and mentally ill, or no
contest, reserving in the record the right, on appealfromthe judgment, to a
review of the adverse determination of any specified pre-trial motion. A defendant who prevails on appeal shall be allowed to withdraw the plea.
(j) When a defendant tenders a plea of guilty and mentally ill, in addition to
the other requirements of this rule, the court shall hold a hearing within a
reasonable time to determine if the defendant is mentally ill in accordance
with Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-103.
(Amended effective May 1, 1993; January 1, 1996.)

77-13-6. Withdrawal of plea.
(1) A plea of not guilty may be withdrawn at any time prior to conviction.
(2) (a) A plea of guilty or no contest may be withdrawn only upon good cause
shown and with leave of the court.
(b) A request to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest is made by
motion and shall be made within 30 days after the entry of the plea.
(3) This section does not restrict the rights of an imprisoned person under
Rule 65B, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

77*29-5. Interstate agreement on detainers — Enactment
into law — Text of agreement.
The interstate agreement on detainers is hereby enacted into law and
entered into by this state with all other jurisdictions legally joining therein in
the form substantially as follows;
The contracting states solemnly agree that:
ARTICLE I
The party statesfindthat charges outstanding against a prisoner, detainers
based on untried indictments, informations or complaints, and difficulties in
securing speedy trial of persons already incarcerated in other jurisdictions,
produce uncertainties which obstruct programs of prisoner treatment and
rehabilitation. Accordingly, it is the policy of the party states and the purpose
of this agreement to encourage the expeditious and orderly disposition of such
charges and determination of the proper status of any and all detainers based
on untried indictments, informations or complaints. The party states also find
that proceedings with reference to such charges and detainers, when emanating from another jurisdiction, cannot properly be had in the absence of
co-operative procedures. It is the further purpose of this agreement to provide
such co-operative procedures.
ARTICLE II
As used in this agreement:
(a) "State" shall mean a state of the United States; the United States of
America; a territory or possession of the United States; District of
Columbia; the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.
(b) "Sending state" shall mean a state in which a prisoner is incarcerated at the time that he initiates a request forfinaldispositions pursuant
to Article III hereof or at the time that a request for custody or availability
is initiated pursuant to Article IV hereof.
(c) "Receiving state" shall mean the state in which trial is to be had on
an indictment, information or complaint pursuant to Article III or Article
IV hereof.
ARTICLE HI
(a) Whenever a person has entered upon a term of imprisonment in a penal
or correctional institution of a party state, and whenever during the continuance of the term of imprisonment there is pending in any other party state
any untried indictment, information or complaint on the basis of which a
detainer has been lodged against the prisoner, he shall be brought to trial
within 180 days after he shall have caused to be delivered to the prosecuting
officer and the appropriate court of the prosecuting officer's jurisdiction written
notice of the place of his imprisonment and his request for afinaldisposition
to be made of the indictment, information or complaint; provided that for good
cause shown in open court, the prisoner or his counsel being present, the court
having jurisdiction of the matter may grant any necessary or reasonable
continuance. The request of the prisoner shall be accompanied by a certificate
of the appropriate official having custody of the prisoner, stating the term of
commitment under which the prisoner is being held, the time already served,
the time remaining to be served on the sentence, the amount of good time
earned, the time of parole eligibility of the prisoner, and any decisions of the
state parole agency relating to the prisoner.
(b) The written notice and request for final disposition referred to in
paragraph (a) hereof shall be given or sent by the prisoner to the warden,
commissioner of corrections or other official having custody of him, who shall
promptly forward it together with the certificate to the appropriate prosecuting official and court by registered or certified mail, return receipt requested.

(c) The warden, commissioner of corrections or other official having custody
of the prisoner shall promptly inform him of the source and contents of any
detainer lodged against him and shall also inform him of his right to make a
request for final disposition of the indictment, information or complaint on
which the detainer is based.
(d) Any request for final disposition made by a prisoner pursuant to
paragraph (a) hereof shall operate as a request for final disposition of all
untried indictments, informations or complaints on the basis of which
detainers have been lodged against the prisoner from the state to whose
prosecuting official the request forfinaldisposition is specifically directed. The
warden, commissioner of corrections or other official having custody of the
prisoner shall forthwith notify all appropriate prosecuting officers and courts
in the several jurisdictions within the state to which the prisoner's request for
final disposition is being sent of the proceeding being initiated by the prisoner.
Any notification sent pursuant to this paragraph shall be accompanied by
copies of the prisoner's written notice, request, and the certificate. If trial is not
had on any indictment, information or complaint contemplated hereby prior to
the return of the prisoner to the original place of imprisonment, such
indictment, information or complaint shall not be of any further force or effect,
and the court shall enter an order dismissing the same with prejudice.
(e) Any request for final disposition made by a prisoner pursuant to a
paragraph (a) hereof shall also be deemed to be a waiver of extradition with
respect to any charge or proceeding contemplated thereby or included therein
by reason of paragraph (d) hereof, and a waiver of extradition to the receiving
state to serve any sentence there imposed upon him, after completion of his
term of imprisonment in the sending state. The request for final disposition
shall also constitute a consent by the prisoner to the production of his body in
any court where his presence may be required in order to effectuate the
purposes of this agreement and a further consent voluntarily to be returned to
the original place of imprisonment in accordance with the provisions of this
agreement. Nothing in this paragraph shall prevent the imposition of a
concurrent sentence if otherwise permitted by law.
(f) Escapefromcustody by the prisoner subsequent to his execution of the
request for final disposition referred to in paragraph (a) hereof shall void the
request.
ARTICLE IV
(a) The appropriate officer of the jurisdiction in which an untried indictment, information or complaint is pending shall be entitled to have a prisoner
against whom he has lodged a detainer and who is serving a term of
imprisonment in any party state made available in accordance with Article
V(a) hereof upon presentation of a written request for temporary custody or
availability to the appropriate authorities of the state in which the prisoner is
incarcerated; provided that the court having jurisdiction of such indictment,
information or complaint shall have duly approved, recorded and transmitted
the request; and provided further that there shall be a period of 30 days after
receipt by the appropriate authorities before the request be honored, within
which period the governor of the sending state may disapprove the request for
temporaiy custody or availability, either upon his own motion or upon motion
of the prisoner.
(b) Upon receipt of the officer's written request as provided in paragraph (a)
hereof, the appropriate authorities having the prisoner in custody shall furnish
the officer with a certificate stating the term of commitment under which the
prisoner is being held, the time already served, the time remaining to be served
on the sentence, the amount of good time earned, the time of parole eligibility
of the prisoner, and any decisions of the state parole agency relating to the
prisoner. Said authorities simultaneously shall furnish all other officers and
appropriate courts in the receiving state who have lodged detainers against the
prisoner with similar certificates and with notices informing them of the
request for custody or availability and of the reasons therefor.

(c) In respect of any proceeding made possible by this article, trial shall be
commenced within one hundred twenty days of the arrival of the prisoner in
the receiving state, but for good cause shown in open court, the prisoner or his
counsel being present, the court having jurisdiction of the matter may grant
any necessary or reasonable continuance.
(d) Nothing contained in the article shall be construed to deprive any
prisoner of anyrightwhich he may have to contest the legality of his delivery
as provided in paragraph (a) hereof, but such delivery may not be opposed or
denied on the ground that the executive authority of the sending state has not
affirmatively consented to or ordered such delivery.
(e) If trial is not had on any indictment, information or complaint contemplated hereby prior to the prisoner's being returned to the original place of
imprisonment pursuant to Article V(e) hereof, such indictment, information or
complaint shall not be of any further force or effect, and the court shall enter
an order dismissing the same with prejudice.
ARTICLE V
(a) In response to a request made under Article III or Article IV hereof, the
appropriate authority in a sending state shall offer to deliver temporary
custody of such prisoner to the appropriate authority in the state where such
indictment, information or complaint is pending against such person in order
that speedy and efficient prosecution may be had. If the request for final
disposition is made by the prisoner, the offer of temporary custody shall
accompany the written notice provided for in Article III of this agreement. In
the case of a federal prisoner, the appropriate authority in the receiving state
shall be entitled to temporary custody as provided by this agreement or to the
prisoner's presence in federal custody at the place for trial, whichever custodial
arrangement may be approved by the custodian.
(b) The officer or other representative of a state accepting an offer of
temporary custody shall present the following upon demand:
(1) Proper identification and evidence of his authority to act for the
state into whose temporary custody the prisoner is to be given.
(2) A duly certified copy of the indictment, information or complaint on
the basis of which the detainer has been lodged and on the basis of which
the request for temporary custody of the prisoner has been made.
(c) If the appropriate authority shall refuse or fail to accept temporary
custody of said person, or in the event that an action on the indictment,
information or complaint on the basis of which the detainer has been lodged is
not brought to trial within the period provided in Article III or Article IV
hereof, the appropriate court of the jurisdiction where the indictment, information or complaint has been pending shall enter an order dismissing the
same with prejudice, and any detainer based thereon shall cease to be of any
force or effect.
(d) The temporary custody referred to in this agreement shall be only for the
purpose of permitting prosecution on the charge or charges contained in one or
more untried indictments, informations or complaints which form the basis of
the detainer or detainers or for prosecution on any other charge or charges
arising out of the same transaction. Except for his attendance at court and
while being transported to or from any place at which his presence may be
required, the prisoner shall be held in a suitable jail or other facility regularly
used for persons awaiting prosecution.
(e) At the earliest practicable time consonant with the purposes of this
agreement, the prisoner shall be returned to the sending state.
(f) During the continuance of temporary custody or while the prisoner is
otherwise being made available for trial as required by this agreement, time
being served on the sentence shall continue to run but good time shall be
earned by the prisoner only if, and to the extent that, the law and practice of
the jurisdiction which imposed the sentence may allow.

(g) For all purposes other than that for which temporary custody as
provided in this agreement is exercised, the prisoner shall be deemed to
remain in the custody of and subject to the jurisdiction of the sending state and
any escapefromtemporary custody may be dealt with in the same manner as
an escape from the original place of imprisonment or in any other manner
permitted by law.
(h) Prom the time that a party state receives custody of a prisoner pursuant
to this agreement until such prisoner is returned to the territory and custody
of the sending state, the state in which the one or more untried indictments,
informations or complaints are pending or in which trial is being had shall be
responsible for the prisoner and shall also pay all costs of transporting, caring
for, keeping and returning the prisoner. The provisions of this paragraph shall
govern unless the states concerned shall have entered into a supplementary
agreement providing for a different allocation of costs and responsibilities as
between or among themselves. Nothing herein contained shall be construed to
alter or affect any internal relationship among the departments, agencies and
officers of and in the government of a party state, or between a party state and
its subdivisions, as to the payment of costs, or responsibilities therefor.
ARTICLE VI
(a) In determining the duration and expiration dates of the time periods
provided in Articles III and IV of this agreement, the running of said time
periods shall be tolled whenever and for as long as the prisoner is unable to
stand trial, as determined by the court having jurisdiction of the matter.
(b) No provision of this agreement, and no remedy made available by this
agreement, shall apply to any person who is adjudged to be mentally ill.
ARTICLE VII
Each state party to this agreement shall designate an officer who, acting
jointly with like officers of other party states, shall promulgate rules and
regulations to carry out more effectively the terms and provisions of this
agreement, and who shall provide, within and without the state, information
necessary to the effective operation of this agreement.
ARTICLE VIII
This agreement shall enter into full force and effect as to a party state when
such state has enacted the same into law. A state party to this agreement may
withdraw herefrom enacting a statute repealing the same. However, the
withdrawal of any state shall not affect the status of any proceedings already
initiated by inmates or by state officers at the time such withdrawal takes
effect, nor shall it affect their rights in respect thereof.
ARTICLE K
This agreement shall be liberally construed so as to effectuate its purposes.
The provisions of this agreement shall be severable and if any phrase, clause,
sentence or provision of this agreement is declared to be contrary to the
Constitution of any party state or of the United States or the applicability
thereof to any government, agency, person or circumstance is held invalid, the
validity of the remainder of this agreement and the applicability thereof to any
government, agency, person or circumstance shall not be affected thereby. If
this agreement shall be held contrary to the Constitution* of any state party
hereto, the agreement shall remain in full force and effect as to the remaining
states and in full force and effect as to the state affected as to all severable
matters.

ADDENDUM B

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL totfiTRICTJ
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STATE OF UTAH

t=^£>c,

AFFIDAVIT OF DEFENDANT

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
V.

ROGER EUGENE PENMAN,

Criminal No. CR88-1015

Defendant.

I, ROGER EUGENE PENMAN, under oath, hereby acknowledge that
I have entered a no contest to the charge of:
CRIMINAL HOMICIDE MANSLAUGHTER
Elements:

Facts:

That the defendent as a
party to the offense
recklessly caused the
death of another.

On October 31, 1987 at 111 South
Allen Street, Midvale, Utah;
the defendant was a party to a
robbery during the commission
of which, the victim of that
robbery, Spencer Neilsen, was
killed.

I have received a copy of the charge (Information) and
understand the crime I am pleading no contest to is a Second Degree
Felony and understand the punishment for this crime may be a 1 - 15
years prison term, $10,000.00 fine, or both.
alcohol.

I am not on drugs or

My plea of no contest is freely and voluntarily made. I

am represented by Attorney(s) FRANCES M. PALACIOS and
JAMES C. BRADSHAW, who have explained my rights to me and I
understand them.
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1. I know that I have a constitutional right to plead not
guilty and to have a jury trial upon the charge to which I
have entered a plea of no contest, or to a trial by a judge
should I desire.
2. I know that if I wish to have a trial, I have a right
to see and hear the witnesses against me in open court in
my presence and before the Judge and jury with the right to
have those witnesses cross examined by my attorney. I also
know that I have a right to have my witnesses subpoenaed at
state expense to testify in court upon my behalf and that I
could testify on my own behalf, and that if I choose not to
do so, the jury will be told that this may not be held
against me.
3. I know that if I were to have a trial that the
prosecutor must prove each and every element of the crime
charged beyond a reasonable doubt, that any verdict
rendered by a jury whether it be that of guilty or not
guilty must be by a complete agreement of all jurors.
4. I know that under the constitution that I have a right
not to give evidence against myself and that this means
that I cannot be compelled to admit that I have committed
any crime and cannot be compelled to testify unless I
choose to do so.
5. I know that under the constitution of Utah that if I
were tried and convicted by a jury or by the Judge that I
would have a right to appeal my conviction and sentence to
the Supreme Court of Utah for review of the trial
proceedings and that if I could not afford to pay the costs
for such appeal, that those costs would be paid by the
State without cost to me.
6. I know and understand that by entering a plea of no
contest I am giving up my constitutional rights as set out
in the preceding paragraphs.
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7. I also know that if I am on probation, parolef or
awaiting sentencing upon another offense of which I have
been convicted or to which I have plead no contest, my plea
in the present action may result in consecutive sentences
being imposed on me,
8. I know that the fact that I have entered a plea of no
contest does not mean that the Judge will not impose either
a fine or sentence of imprisonment upon me and no promises
have been made to me by anyone as to what the sentence will
be.
9. No promises or threats of any kind have been made to
induce me to plead no contest. OTHER AGREEMENTS OF THIS
PLEA NEGOTIATION INCLUDE dismissal of the remaining counts,
no objection by the state that these counts run
concurrently, and that a letter will be sent by the state
to the Board of Pardons addressing the State's inability to
prove Mr. Penman as the actual perpetrator of the
homicide. No other charge(s) will be filed against me for
other crimes I may have committed which are now known to
the prosecuting attorney, I am also aware that any charge
or sentencing concessions or recommendations or probation
or suspended sentences, including a reduction of the
charges for sentencing made or sought by either defense
counsel or counsel for the State, is not binding on the
judge and may not be approved by the Judge.
10. I understand that although I am pleading no contest
that plea is of the same force and effect as pleading
guilty and that my plea of no contest will be treated the
same as a guilty plea.
11. I have read this Affidavit, or I have had it read to me
by my attorney and I know and understand its contents. I
am 26 years of age, have attended school through

the
M-£B + /tfL /Ift&ctfZ-' and I can read and understand
the English language.
U
DATED this **oXJt\ day of October, 1988.
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SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me in Court this

g? fc day

of October, 1988.

ATTEST
H.DIXOWHINDLEY
JUDGE
IDGE flTOHN A .

ROKICH *

©•putyOkvk

CERTIFICATE OF DEFENSE ATTORNEY:
We certify that we are the attorney for ROGER EUGENE
PENMAN, the defendant named above, and we know he has read the
Affidavit, or that we have read it to him, and we discussed it with
him and believe he fully understands the meaning of its contents and
is mentally and physically competent.

To the best of our knowledge

and belief, the statements, representations and declarations made by
the defendant in the foregoing Affidavit are in all respects
accurate and true.

CES M

L&*f-?

LACIOS, ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT

S C. BRADSHAW, ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT

- 4 -

f
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CERTIFICATE OF PROSECUTING ATTORNEY:
I certify that I am the attorney for the State of Utah in
its case against ROGER EUGENE PENMAN/ defendant.

I have reviewed

the Affidavit of the defendant and find that the declarations are
true and accurate. No improper inducements/ threats, or coercions
to encourage a plea have been offered the defendant.

There is

reasonable cause to believe the evidence would support the
conviction of the defendant for the plea offered/ and that
acceptance of the plea would serve th^Jmblic iflterelstJ.

ENN K. IWASAKI, DEPUTY COUNTY ATTORNEY

ORDER
Based upon the facts set forth in the foregoing Affidavit
and certification/ the Court finds the defendant's plea of no
contest is freely and voluntarily made and it is ordered that
defendant's plea of "No Contest" to the charge/ set forth in the
Affidavit be accepted and entered.
Done in Court this

^ Y day of October/ 1988.

<??£—

A

ISTRICT JUDGE JOHN A. ROKICH

ATTEST
RDIXONHWOUET
- 5 -

•y u

"

r

[K

Deputy

K
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IN THE DISTRICT CODRT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,

AFFIDAVIT OF DEFENDANT

Plaintiff,
V.

Criminal No. CR88-1015

ROGER EUGENE PENMAN,
Defendant,

I, ROGER EUGENE PENMAN, under oath, hereby acknowledge the
I have entered a guilty to the charge of:
ROBBERY
Elements:

Facts:

That the defendent as a
party to the offense
unlawfully and intentionally took the property of
another from his immediate
presence against his will
and accomplished this by
means of force or fear.

On October 31, 1987 at 111 Sout
Allen Street, Midvale, Utah;
the defendant took property
from the immediate presence of
Spencer Neilsen by means of foi
or fear.

I have received a copy of the charge (Information) and
understand the crime I am pleading guilty to is a Second Degree
Felony and understand the punishment for this crime may be a 1 - II
years prison term, $10,000.00 fine, or both.
alcohol.

I am not on drugs or

My plea of guilty is freely and voluntarily made.

I am

represented by Attorney(s) FRANCES M. PALACIOS and
JAMES C. BRADSHAW, who have explained my rights to me and I
understand them.

C0 0 r 8 4

1. I know that I have a constitutional right to plead not
guilty and to have a jury trial upon the charge to which I
have entered a plea of guilty, or to a trial by a judge
should I desire.
2. I know that if I wish to have a trial, I have a right
to see and hear the witnesses against me in open court in
my presence and before the Judge and jury with the right to
have those witnesses cross examined by my attorney. I also
know that I have a right to have my witnesses subpoenaed at
state expense to testify in court upon my behalf and that I
could testify on my own behalf, and that if I choose not to
do so, the jury will be told that this may not be held
against me.
3. I know that if I were to have a trial that the
prosecutor must prove each and every element of the crime
charged beyond a reasonable doubt, that any verdict
rendered by a jury whether it be that of guilty or not
guilty must be by a complete agreement of all jurors.
4. I know that under the constitution that I have a right
not to give evidence against myself and that this means
that I cannot be compelled to admit that I have committed
any crime and cannot be compelled to testify unless I
choose to do so.
5. I know that under the constitution of Utah that if I
were tried and convicted by a jury or by the Judge that I
would have a right to appeal my conviction and sentence to
the Supreme Court of Utah for review of the trial
proceedings and that if I could not afford to pay the costs
for such appeal, that those costs would be paid by the
State without cost to me.
6. I know and understand that by entering a plea of guilty
I am giving up my constitutional rights as set out in the
preceding paragraphs.

0000SS

7 • I also know that if I am on probation, parole, or
awaiting sentencing upon another offense of which I have
been convicted or to which I have plead guilty, my plea in
the present action may result in consecutive sentences
being imposed on me.
8. I know that the fact that I have entered a plea of
guilty does not mean that the Judge will not impose either
a fine or sentence of imprisonment upon me and no promises
have been made to me by anyone as to what the sentence will
be.
9. No promises or threats of any kind have been made to
induce me to plead guilty. OTHER AGREEMENTS OF THIS PLEA
NEGOTIATION INCLUDE dismissal of the remaining counts, no
objection by the state that these counts run concurrently,
and that a letter will be sent by the State to the Board of
Pardons addressing the State's inability to prove
Mr. Penman as the actual perpetrator of the homicide. No
other charge(s) will be filed against me for other crimes I
may have committed which are now known to the prosecuting
attorney, I am also aware that any charge or sentencing
concessions or recommendations or probation or suspended
sentences, including a reduction of the charges for
sentencing made or sought by either defense counsel or
counsel for the State, is not binding on the judge and may
not be approved by the Judge.
10. I have read this Affidavit, or I have had it read to me
by my attorney and I know and understand its contents. I
am 26 years of age, have attended school through
the &?,u~t f LfaAfrtLt^z,
and I can read and understand
the English l^guage,

osd

DATED t h i s &<5Ch day of October, 1988.

-

3 -
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SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me in Court t h i s

7 rC day

of October, 1988.

(
*

*

0 /TsrktrJS*
^

~

JUDGE JOHN A . ROKICH '

Deputy C^K

^ - ^

CERTIFICATE OF DEFENSE ATTORNEY:
We certify that we are the attorney for ROGER EUGENE
PENMAN/ the defendant named above, and we know he has read the
Affidavit^ or that we have read it to him, and we discussed it with
him and believe he fully understands the meaning of its contents and
is mentally and physically competent•

To the best of our knowledge

and belief, the statements, representations and declarations made by
the defendant in the foregoing Affidavit are in all respects
accurate and true.

FRANCES!M. PALACIOS/ ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT

JAMES C.'SRADSHAW/ ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT

- 4 -

0€OOS7

CERTIFICATE OF PROSECUTING ATTORNEY:
I certify that I am the attorney for the State of Utah in
its case against ROGER EUGENE PENMAN, defendant*

I have reviewed

the Affidavit of the defendant and find that the declarations are
true and accurate.

No improper inducements, threats, or coercions

to encourage a plea have been offered the defendant.

There is

reasonable cause to believe the evidence would support the
conviction of the defendant for the p^ea offered, and that
acceptance of the plea would serv^yclre public jftyfcetfest.

'dU^s
GLENN K. IWASA

TK&L
EPUTY COUNTY ATTORNEY

ORDER
Based upon the facts set forth in the foregoing Affidavit
and certification, the Court finds the defendant's plea of guilty is
freely and voluntarily made and it is ordered that defendant's plea
of "Guilty" to the charge, set forth in the Affidavit be accepted
and entered.
Done in Court this

day of October, 1988.

nDISTRICT JUDGE
JU
JOHN A. ROKICH

ATTEST
H. DIXON HINOLEY
Ctorfc
Deputy Ctorlt

-

5

-
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ADDENDUM C

1

SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH; OCTOBER 28, 198 8

2

P R O C E E D I N G S

3

THE COURT:

4

STATE OF UTAH V. ROGER EUGENE

PENMAN. CR 88-1051.

5

MAY THE RECORD INDICATE THAT THE DEFENDANT IS

6

PRESENT, REPRESENTED BY MRS. PALACIOS AND MR. BRADSHAW,

7

AND THE STATE IS REPRESENTED BY MR. IWASAKI.

8
9
10
11

I

IT IS MY UNDERSTANDING THAT A PLEA BARGAIN
ARRANGEMENT HAS BEEN ENTERED WHICH COUNSEL SUBMITTED TO
THE COURT FOR IT'S APPROVAL.
MS. PALACIOS:

THAT'S CORRECT, YOUR HONOR.

12

WE HAVE REACHED AN AGREEMENT.

13

WITHDRAW OUR PREVIOUSLY ENTERED PLEAS TO COUNTS 1 AND 2

14

OF THE INFORMATION; THE STATE THEN WOULD MOVE FOR THE

15

NECESSARY AMENDMENTS TO ALLOW MR. PENMAN TO PLEAD NO

16

CONTEST TO CRIMINAL HOMICIDE, MANSLAUGHTER, A

17

SECOND-DEGREE FELONY; AND GUILTY TO ROBBERY, A

18

SECOND-DEGREE FELONY.

19

WE WOULD TODAY MOVE TO

FURTHER ASPECTS OF THE PLEA NEGOTIATION

20

INCLUDE A DISMISSAL OF THE REMAINING COUNTS.

FURTHER,

21

THE STATE WOULD NOT OBJECT TO OUR REQUEST THAT THESE

22

MATTERS RUN CONCURRENTLY, AND A LETTER WILL BE SENT BY

23

THE STATE TO THE BOARD OF PARDONS ADDRESSING THE

24

STATE'S INABILITY TO PROVE MR. PENMAN WAS THE ACTUAL

25

PERPETRATOR OF THE HOMICIDE.

M026*

1

MR. IWASAKI:

THAT IS CORRECT, YOUR HONOR.

2

AND I WOULD SO MOVE TO ALLOW MR. PENMAN TO

3

PLEAD TO THE LESSER-INCLUDED CHARGES OF MANSLAUGHTER, A

4

LESSER-INCLUDED OF COUNT 1; AND SIMPLE ROBBERY, A

5

LESSER-INCLUDED OF COUNT 2.

6

DISMISS THE REMAINING COUNTS UPON ACCEPTANCE OF THE

7

PLEA.

8

MS. PALACIOS:

9

I WOULD ALSO NOW MOVE TO

I BELIEVE THE COURT STILL HAS

THE ORIGINAL ONE?

10

THE COURT:

11

YES.

I HAVE THE AFFIDAVIT RIGHT

HERE.

12

LET ME JUST GET THE INFORMATION.

13

THAT—

14

OKAY.

NOW, LET'S GO BACK THROUGH THIS AGAIN

15

SO I CAN AMEND THIS ACCORDINGLY.

16

AMEND THAT TO?

17

MR. IWASAKI:

18

THE COURT:

20

22
23
24
25

COUNT 1, YOU'RE GOING

TO CRIMINAL HOMICIDE,

MANSLAUGHTER, A SECOND-DEGREE FELONY.

19

21

I CAN GET

JUST A MINUTE.

MANSLAUGHTER

FROM A SECOND DEGREE?
I

MR. IWASAKI:

THAT IS CORRECT.

COUNT 2 WILL BE AMENDED TO READ ROBBERY,
STRIKING "AGGRAVATED," A SECOND-DEGREE FELONY.
THE COURT:

AND THEN COUNTS 3, 4, AND 5 WILL

BE DISMISSED UPON THE ENTRY OF A PLEA OF GUILTY TO
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2

1
2

COUNT 2 AND A NO-CONTEST TO COUNT 1; IS THAT CORRECT?
1

MR. IWASAKI:

THAT'S CORRECT.

3

MS. PALACIOS:

4

THE COURT:

5

THAT IS CORRECT, YOUR HONOR.

THE COURT HAS SO AMENDED, BASED

ON REPRESENTATION AND STIPULATION OF COUNSEL.

6

THE INFORMATION HAS BEEN AMENDED TO REPRESENT

7

COUNT 1, CRIMINAL MANSLAUGHTER, SECOND-DEGREE FELONY;

8

COUNT 2, A SECOND-DEGREE FELONY, JUST PLAIN ROBBERY.

9

AND UPON THE ENTRY OF THE PLEAS, COUNTS 3, 4, AND 5

10

WILL BE DISMISSED.

11
12

OKAY.

NOW, MR. PENMAN, I PRESUME THAT YOU

READ, WRITE, AND UNDERSTAND THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE?

13

THE DEFENDANT:

14

THE COURT:

YES, SIR, I DO.

AND ARE YOU PRESENTLY UNDER THE

15

INFLUENCE OF ANY DRUGS OR ALCOHOL?

16

THE DEFENDANT:

17

THE COURT:

18

SUFFERING FROM ANY MENTAL

ILLNESS?

19

THE DEFENDANT:

20

THE COURT:

21

NO, SIR.

NO, SIR.

NOW, YOU UNDERSTAND BY ENTERING

I A PLEA OF GUILTY TO COUNT 1, CRIMINAL MANSLAUGHTER, A

22

SECOND-DEGREE FELONY; AND COUNT 2, ROBBERY, A

23

SECOND-DEGREE FELONY, THAT YOU WILL BE GIVING UP

24

CERTAIN CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, SUCH AS A SPEEDY TRIAL,

25

RIGHT TO CONFRONT WITNESSES, YOUR RIGHT TO BE TRIED BY

00026

A JURY , RIGHT TO BE PROVEN GUILTY BEYOND A REASONABLE
DOUBT, AND A RIGHT TO APPEAL IF CONVICTED?
DO YOU UNDERSTAND THAT?
THE DEFENDANT:
MS. PALACIOS:

YES, SIR.
YOUR HONOR, THAT'S A

NO-CONTEST TO THE —
THE COURT:

I UNDERSTAND IT'S A

YES.

NO-CONTEST.
THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

1

YES.

BUT,, NEVERTHELESS, YOU ARE

GIVING UP ALL THOSE RIGHTS;: AND YOU WILL ACTUALLY BE
GIVING ALL THOSE RIGHTS UP.
•

THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

YES, SIR.

NOW, YOU UNDERSTAND THE PENALTY

1

FOR A SECOND-DEGREE FELONY IS ONE TO FIFTEEN YEARS AT
UTAH STATE PRISON, AND A $10,000 FINE PLUS A :25 PERCENT

1

SURCHARGE, AND THAT THE SENTENCES CAN RUN
CONSECUTIVELY.»
DO YOU UNDERSTAND THAT?
THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

i

YES, SIR.

ARE YOU SATISFIED WITH THE

1

ADVISE OF YOUR COUNSEL, MR. BRADSBAW AND
MRS. PALACIOS?
THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

YES.

NOW, I WANT TO MAKE IT CLEARLY

000269

4

1

UNDERSTOOD TO YOU:

DESPITE THE FACT THAT YOU HAVE

2

ENTERED INTO SUCH PLEA ARRANGEMENTS WITH THE STATE, IT

3

DOES NOT NECESSARILY MEAN THAT THE COURT IS GOING TO

4

FOLLOW THOSE RECOMMENDATIONS.

5

DO YOU UNDERSTAND THAT?

6

THE DEFENDANT:

7

THE COURT:

YES, SIR.

NOW, I HAVE MADE NO PROMISES TO

8

ANYONE AS TO WHAT I'M GOING TO DO WITH REGARDS TO WHAT

9

I'LL DO IN SENTENCING, WHETHER I'LL MAKE THEM

10

CONSECUTIVELY, OR CONCURRENTLY.

11

DISCRETION, REGARDLESS OF WHAT THIS AFFIDAVIT HERE

12

STATES.

13

DO YOU UNDERSTAND THAT?

14

THE DEFENDANT:

15

THE COURT:

16

THAT WILL BE MY

YES, I UNDERSTAND.

SO KNOWING THAT, KNOWING THAT,

DO YOU STILL WANT TO PROCEED?

17

THE DEFENDANT:

18

THE COURT:

YES, SIR.

OKAY.

NOW, COUNSEL, WITH REGARD

19

TO THE ELEMENTS OF CRIMINAL HOMICIDE, MANSLAUGHTER,

20

THAT THE DEFENDANT, AS A PARTY TO THE OFFENSE,

21

RECKLESSLY CAUSED THE DEATH OF ANOTHER; DOES THAT

22

CONSTITUTE THE ELEMENTS?

23
24
25

MR. IWASAKI:
I

THE COURT:

IT DOES, YOUR HONOR.

AND THE FACTS WERE THAT ON

OCTOBER 31ST, 1987, AT 111 SOUTH ALLEN STREET, MIDVALE,

000270

1

UTAH, THE DEFENDANT WAS A PARTY TO A ROBBERY, DURING

2

THE COMMISSION OF WHICH THE VICTIM OF THAT ROBBERY,

3

SPENCER NIELSEN, WAS KILLED.

4

DOES THAT CONSTITUTE THE FACTS?

5

MR. IWASAKI:

6

AS SUCCINCTLY AS COUNSEL HAS

DONE IT, YES.

7

THE COURT:

NOW, AS TO THIS ALLEGATION TO

8

WHICH YOU A R E — YOUR PLEA IS A NO-CONTEST, IS THAT

9

CORRECT?

10

THE DEFENDANT:

11

THE COURT:

YES, SIR.

OKAY.

SO THEN, AS SET OUT IN

12

THIS AFFIDAVIT, ARE THE FACTS TRUE AND CORRECT TO THE

13

BEST OF YOUR KNOWLEDGE?

14

THE DEFENDANT:

15

THE COURT:

16

YES, YOUR HONOR.

NOW, WHAT IS YOUR PLEA, THEN, TO

COUNT 1, CRIMINAL HOMICIDE, MANSLAUGHTER?

17

THE DEFENDANT:

18

THE COURT:

NO CONTEST, YOUR HONOR.

ALL RIGHT.

THEN WITH REGARD TO

19

COUNT 2, ROBBERY, THE ELEMENTS ARE THAT THE DEFENDANT,

20

AS A PARTY TO THE OFFENSE, UNLAWFULLY AND INTENTIONALLY

21

TOOK THE PROPERTY OF ANOTHER FROM HIS IMMEDIATE

22

PRESENCE AGAINST HIS WILL, AND ACCOMPLISHED THIS BY

23

MEANS OF FORCE OR FEAR.

24
25

DOES THAT CONSTITUTE THE ELEMENTS?
I

MR. IWASAKI:

IT DOES, YOUR HONOR.
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THE COURT:

AND THE FACTS ARE THAT ON

OCTOBER 31ST, 1987, AT 111 SOUTH ALLEN STREET, MIDVALE,
UTAH, DEFENDANT TOOK PROPERTY FROM THE IMMEDIATE
PRESENCE OF SPENCER NIELSEN BY MEANS OF FORCE OR FEAR?
ARE THOSE THE FACTS, MR. PENMAN?
THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

YES, SIR.

AND YOU UNDERSTAND THE ELEMENTS

OF BOTH OF THOSE CHARGES.
NOW, WHAT IS YOUR PLEA, THEN, TO ROBBERY,
COUNT 2, ROBBERY, SECOND DEGREE?
THE DEFENDANT:

THAT WOULD BE GUILTY, YOUR

HONOR.
THE COURT:

GUILTY.

NOW, ARE YOU ENTERING A

PLEA BECAUSE YOU DID, IN FACT, COMMIT THE ROBBERY?
THE DEFENDANT:

YES.

I WAS A PARTY TO THE

OFFENSE OF ROBBERY; YES, YOUR HONOR.
THE COURT:

NOW, WOULD YOU SIGN THESE

AFFIDAVITS IN OPEN COURT.
MAY THE RECORD INDICATE THAT THE DEFENDANT
HAS EXECUTED THE AFFIDAVITS IN OPEN COURT.
THE COURT FURTHER FINDS THAT THE DEFENDANT,
UNDERSTANDING THE ELEMENTS, AND UNDERSTANDING THE
CONTENTS OF THE AFFIDAVITS, AND IN RESPONSE TO THE
COURT'S QUESTIONING, HAS ENTERED A PLEA HERE KNOWINGLY
AND VOLUNTARILY OF NO CONTEST TO COUNT If AND AS TO
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7

COUNT 2, HE ENTERED A PLEA OF GUILTY.
NOW, MR. PENMAN, I MUST SENTENCE YOU IN NOT
LESS THAN TWO NOR MORE THAN 30 DAYS.
REQUIRE A PRESENTENCING REPORT.

GENERALLY I

AND IN THIS PARTICULAR

CASE, MR. PENMAN, IT'S MY UNDERSTANDING THAT YOU WANT
TO BE SENTENCED RIGHT HERE TODAY.
DO YOU WAIVE THE TIME FOR SENTENCING?
THE DEFENDANT:

YES, YOUR HONOR.

I WOULD

LIKE TO MAKE A STATEMENT TO THE COURT AND THEN I WOULD
ALSO LIKE TO WAIVE THE TIME.
THE COURT:

FINE.

GO AHEAD AND MAKE YOUR

STATEMENT.
MR. IWASAKI:

BEFORE MR. PENMAN MAKES HIS

STATEMENT, I'M SORRY TO INTERRUPT, BUT DID YOUR HONOR
ASK FOR A PLEA ON THE MANSLAUGHTER?
THE COURT:

YES.

MS. PALACIOS:

OH, WAIT A MINUTE.

HE DID SAY NO CONTEST.

MR. IWASAKI:

HE SAID HE WAS GOING TO ENTER A

PLEA OF NO CONTEST.
THE COURT:

LET ME GET THAT FOR THE RECORD.

AS TO COUNT 1, CRIMINAL HOMICIDE,
MANSLAUGHTER, WHAT IS YOUR PLEA?
THE DEFENDANT:

YES, I ENTER A NO-CONTEST

PLEA.
THE COURT:

NO-CONTEST PLEA, JUST FOR THE
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1

RECORD, TO MAKE SURE WE HAVE EVERYTHING STRAIGHT.

2

MR. IWASAKI:

3

THE COURT:

4

THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR.
SO, WE HAVE A PLEA OF GUILTY TO

COUNT 2 AND NO CONTEST TO COUNT 1; CORRECT?

5

THE DEFENDANT:

6

THE COURT:

7

YES.

AND THE AFFIDAVIT REFLECTS THAT,

WHICH YOU HAVE EXECUTED; CORRECT?

8

THE DEFENDANT:

9

THE COURT:

10

YES, SIR.

GO AHEAD AND MAKE YOUR

STATEMENT.

11

MS. PALACIOS:

YOUR HONOR, WE WOULD WAIVE THE

12

MINIMUM TIME FOR SENTENCING AND OFFER SOME INFORMATION

13

FOR THE COURT WITH RESPECT TO SENTENCING, TO SEE IF THE

14

COURT COULD DETERMINE WHETHER OR NOT ON THE ISSUE— THE

15

ONLY OBVIOUS ISSUE HERE IS WHETHER OR NOT IT WILL RUN

16

CONCURRENTLY OR CONSECUTIVELY.

17

LETTER THAT HE IS SENDING TO THE BOARD OF PARDONS THAT

18

WE REVIEWED AS PART OF THE PLEA AGREEMENT, AND WE

19

PERHAPS WOULD HAVE THE COURT READ THAT LETTER FIRST

20

BEFORE I MAKE ANY STATEMENT.

21

I

22

MR. IWASAKI:
THE COURT:
MR. IWASAKI:

MR. IWASAKI HAS A

MAY I APPROACH THE BENCH?
YES, YOU MAY.

23

I

THE RECORD SHOULD INDICATE THAT

24

I IS A ROUGH DRAFT, BUT IT HAS BEEN AGREED UPON BY ALL

25

PARTIES THAT IT WILL BE IN THAT FORM, AND IT WILL
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ADDENDUM D

.7- U.(R«>'. 4-26-78)

REPORT
of the
-•'•ar

To:

XJtBOAATOKT _ J t

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
WASHINGTON, D. C 2 0 5 3 5
S h e r i f f of S a l t LaJce County
Metropolitan Hall of J u s t i c e
437 South Second East
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84111

August 12, 1988

95-281323

FBI FILE NO,

Attention:
Re:

Mr. Jerry Thompson
Detective

ROGER EUGENE PENMAN - SUSPECT;
SPENCER NIELSON - VICTIM;
HOMICIDE

Examination requested by:

LAB. NO.
YOUR NO,

80120078 S TH VZ
87-114571

Addressee
Letter dated January 15, 1988

Reference:
Examination requested:

Firearms - Metals Analysis

Specimens:
Ql

Shotshell wad recovered from victim (Q-2)

02^101

One hundred pellets recovered from victim (Q-3)

Q102

Shotshell recovered from suspect98 pocket (Q-4)

Q103

Shotshell recovered from suspect's pocket (Q-5)

Q104

Shotshell recovered from vehicle (Q-6)

Kl

20-gauge Stevens "sawed off" shotgun, Model 94H,
no serial number (Q-l)

Page 1

(over)

This axamination has been made with the understanding that the evidence ia connected with an official
investigation of a criminal matter and that the Laboratory report will be uaed for official purposes only, related
to the investigation or a subsequent criminal prosecution. Authorization cannot ba granted for the uaa of the
Laboratory report in connection with a civil proceeding.

0 0 0 2 4 0™. -

Result of examination:
Specimen Ql is a plastic shotshell wad from a
20-gauge shotshell. It is consistent in appearance with
the type of wad commercially loaded by Piocchi into shotshells
like specimens Q102 through Q104. Microscopic marks are
present on the side of specimen Ql. However, these marks
could not be associated with marks left on wads test fired
from the barrel of Kl. Therefore, no conclusion could be
reached as to whether specimen Ql was fired from Kl.
Specimens Q2 through Q101 are nickel-plated lead
pellets. Based upon their average weight and diameter, they
were determined to be most consistent with No. 6 shot.
Specimens Q102 through Q104 are 20-gauge shotshells
which were manufactured by Fiocchi. Markings present on the
side of each of these shotshells indicate that they were
commercially loaded with nickel-plated No. 6 shot. The
headstamps on the Q102 through Q104 shotshells were identified
as having been produced by the same tool (bunter) in the
same state of wear. No conclusion could be reached as to
whether one or more of the Q102 through Q104 shotshells had
ever been loaded into the Kl shotgun.
The Kl shotgun was tested and it fired in the
condition in which it was received. It should be noted that
the barrel release lever was bent during test firing.
A representative sample of the Q2 through Q101
pellets, namely Q2 through Q26, and a representative sample
of the pellets from the Q102, Q103, and Q104 shotshells were
analyzed by instrumental means to determine their elemental
compositions. It is noted that the analyzed pellets were
entirely consumed in the analysis process.
Close compositional associations were found among
all the analyzed pellets. Results such as these are Consistent
with all the analyzed pellets originating from the same
shotshell or shotshells within the same box. These results
can also be found among pellets from different boxes of
shotshells of the same type and manufacturer, packaged on
or about the same date.
The portion of the specimens not necessarily
consumed in the analysis process, as well as specimen Kl,
are being returned to your department under separate cover by
Federal Express.
Page 2
80120078 S TH

000241

